Showing posts with label peacetime. Show all posts
Showing posts with label peacetime. Show all posts

Thursday, August 21, 2014

War and Peace in Time and Space

My new paper War and Peace in Time and Space was inspired/provoked by the indomitable Yxta Maya Murray, who invited me to participate in a symposium on Law, Peace and Violence: Jurisprudence and the Possibilities of Peace at Seattle University Law School. Yxta's commitment to peace as something that does or can truly exist in the world helped me to see that, in my work on wartime, I was not taking peace seriously enough. This led me to revisit the question of what peace might be in a nation engaged in ongoing armed conflict. My answer to this puzzle is to turn to geography/spaciality. I will keep working on this in my next book, but here's my take so far.

This essay is a critical reflection on peace, written for a symposium issue on Law, Peace and Violence: Jurisprudence and the Possibilities of Peace. Peacetime and wartime are thought to be temporal concepts, alternating in history, but ongoing wartime seems to blot out any time that is truly free of war. In spite of this, peace is the felt experience of many Americans. We can understand why peace is thought to exist during ongoing war by turning to geographies of war and peace. The experience of American war is not only exported, but is also concentrated in particular American communities, especially locations of military bases. Memorialization of war death is one of the “spaces of the dead,” as Thomas Laquere calls it, separated from daily life. The persistence of war and the separation of killing, dying and the dead from the center of American life is an example of the way war and peace are spatial. War is also simultaneously infused into domestic life and segregated in the context of militarization. This has been on display in the crisis in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014. One thing that makes Ferguson so dramatic is the diffusion of war materiel into domestic policing. It also matters deeply that the officers pointing the weapons are largely white, and the demonstrators are predominately largely African American, making clear the racial geography of militarized policing. In the end, this essay raises the question of whether peace should be sought or celebrated. Perhaps the space of peace during persistent conflict can only be a space of privilege.
My paper is on SSRN. It this topic sounds familiar, it's because I started thinking about it on this blog a while ago.

Friday, January 31, 2014

War and Peace in Time and Space


In a few different talks this semester, I plan to build on the ideas in my last book, and finally take up a question I did not previously have a good answer to.  The book, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences, critically analyzes the way the concept of “wartime” works in law and public policy.  It focuses on war and temporality, arguing that the ideas about war and time that are implicit in law and policy (e.g. that wartime and peacetime are distinct, and follow each other in sequence) are in tension with the history of U.S. military engagement, which has been persistent, not episodic. 

When I gave talks about the project, I was often asked about whether space mattered – essentially whether I should consider time and space together.  I would answer that yes, space/geography is important to American war in part because U.S. military action takes place outside U.S. territory, and, relying on Catherine Lutz’s work, some domestic communities, especially communities with military bases, experience directly domestic costs of war, while other areas are not directly affected.  But time and space did not come together in the work itself.  I figured that the topic of war and time was important enough to be the singular focus of the book.

But I am occasionally asked to say something about peace, and that has finally helped me with how to think about war’s times and spaces together.  The most helpful provocation was an invitation from Yxta Murray of Loyola Law School to speak at a symposium on Law, Peace, and Violence: Jurisprudence and the Possibilities of Peace, at Seattle University School of Law in March. My difficulty: what to say about “peacetime” when I think there is, essentially, no such thing.  Yxta’s generative call for papers seemed to require more than a suggestion that peacetime is an anachronism – in part because peace is such a fervent hope, and peacefulness has been an important political strategy for social movements.

The answer, which I am still working out and which may not be fully satisfactory for Yxta’s conference, was to turn to scholarship on spatiality. When I began working on temporality, I found my way to a tremendously interesting literature on the history and culture of time.  The same is true of space, with developing new work in critical geography. This is helping me to see that my initial thoughts about wartime and space were too simplistic.  And many law-related works that take space or place into account are similarly limited.  When space or place are invoked, sometimes that just means focusing on the local, or perhaps being comparative.  In this way of thinking, there is an implicit normative space, which is the nation.  All else is a departure. But this is, ultimately, not very interesting or helpful.

I started by returning to Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, and looking carefully at his chapters on spatiality, and to Mary Favret’s focus on war and distance.  And I am finding my way into critical geography.  The argument for the peace conference is falling into place: that peace is not a time in the United States, it is a geography.  The geography of peace is driven in part by social class.  Those engaged in the work of American war (soldiers, reservists, military contractors, their families and communities) have a direct experience of “wartime,” while the rest of us can go about our daily lives minimally affected by American military engagement.  Whether it is wartime and peacetime within the United States depends upon who you are and where you live. There are consequences of this for the politics of war, and for political checks on presidential war power – but this will await another paper.  For now, thinking about peace as a geography can be a way of thinking about time and space as different yet intersecting dimensions of the culture and experience of American war.

My first take on this will be a lecture at the Robert S. Strauss Center at the University of Texas next week.  The abstract is below.
In law, history and public policy, we conventionally divide the past into wartimes and peacetimes.  Peacetime is thought to be normal time, and wartime is exceptional.  Harsh wartime policies are tolerable in part because they are temporary. In the long war-era of the 21st century, these temporal assumptions have been remarkably persistent, with President Obama and others suggesting that we will at some point return to peacetime.  This lecture will begin with a critique of wartime as a temporal concept, drawing upon my recent book War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences.  If war’s time limits have eroded, what has become of “peacetime”? Going beyond the wartime critique, I will argue that for the United States “peace” is not a time, but is a spacial concept.  It is because peace is experienced geographically, rather than temporally, that much of the U.S. population can experience peace, while war’s violence is the province of its soldiers and of those who reside in the places of its export.
Take two will be in Seattle, and take three will be at a symposium on The Future of National Security Law at Pepperdine. Then I hope to take the spatial analysis in a different direction, focusing more on a global community of the surveilled that is produced by contemporary security practices for a symposium at Yale’s Center for Historical Enquiry and the Social Sciences. This blog was a helpful place for me to work out the War Time ideas, so I hope you will indulge this new project.  Comments are open -- with thanks in advance for your reading suggestions!

Cross-posted from Balkinization.

Friday, October 18, 2013

Wartime/Peacetime

For my discussion on Saturday at Fire Dog Lake, I thought I would upload a few figures from my book, which can help illustrate some of my arguments.  This one represents traditional thinking about wartime and peacetime -- the idea that they are different from each other, and history progresses by moving from one kind of time to another.


A consequence of this way of thinking is that wartime is, by definition, temporary.  Beginning a wartime involves starting something that, by definition, comes to an end.

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

The Erosion of War and Peace in International Law


International Law Beyond War and Peace

RutiTeitel, Straus Fellow, NYU Law School (2012-2013); Ernst C. Stiefel Prof of Comparative Law, NY Law School

In general, in international law, the distinction between the state of war and the state of peace is becoming less relevant, or at least less determinative of the applicable legal norms. This produces new challenges of interpretation and new trade offs in the relation between law and politics.

Teitel, Humanity's Law
The following are three illustrations of what has been happening.

1. First is the question of when does international criminal justice come into the picture?  At Nuremberg, international criminal responsibility was conceived as fundamentally part of ius post bellum, something that occurs at the end of hostilities.  In a way, it took the place of the kind of collective punishment that became questionable in the wake of the Versaille Treaty.

Today international criminal justice has a transformed functionality, coming into play during conflict, before the peace, and even ex ante (the case of Libya, where referrals to the ICC preceded military intervention in the conflict); indeed it is used as means of regulating conflict itself. We don't need to know whether conflict has ended.

This began with the Balkans war where the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created during the conflict by the Security Council and where its jurisdiction to create a tribunal was its peacemaking powers under the UN Charter chapter 7, and where the very stated aim of the law is to regulate the conflict and to restore the peace. Since then this has been reiterated in the ICC Statute.

The introduction of international criminal law during conflict raises the peace versus justice dilemma. What if the prospect of criminal justice intensifies the conflict or makes peace negotiations more difficult (e.g. Quaddaffi in Libya?)? The flip side is the politicization of law, where criminal prosecutions or the threat of them is used to achieve specific strategic political objectives such as may well have been the case vis avis Milosevic’s indictment at the time of the Dayton negotiations.

The second illustration is that it is now rather well established that international human rights law does not apply only in peacetime.

Continue reading below the fold.

Monday, February 4, 2013

How Peace became a Casualty of the Cold War

From the AALS Panel on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society:

The Concept of Peace During the Cold War
Petra Goedde, Department of History,Temple University

In 1967, Dial Press published what looked like a report commissioned by the US government on the “possibility and desirability of peace.” In the foreword, Leonard C. Lewin explained how a co-author of the report, who insisted on anonymity, asked him to publish it. The report determined that social stability in the United States rested on the so-called “war system, ” in which all basic political, economic, and social functions of American society were built on the assumption of being at war or preparing for war. Therefore, the report advised, a general state of peace was thoroughly undesirable for the United States, since it would produce widespread social instability and economic hardship. After outlining the non-military functions of the war system in stabilizing domestic society, the report went on to suggest ways in which these essential functions could be replicated in the event of general peace. Those included massive spending on education, health, and space to replicate the “waste” economy of the war system. It also suggested creating alternative “enemies” to ensure continued political stability(remember the “war on poverty” “ war on drugs?”). It also included a more outlandish proposal to re-introduce a modern form of slavery in order to replicate the social regulatory function of military service. The published book became a bestseller while speculation ran high whether this was an authentic report as the foreword claimed, or a well-placed hoax. A New York Times book review speculated (correctly) that it was a hoax, but many, especially those working in government, continued to believe in the report’s authenticity. Even after Lewin publicly announced in 1972, that he had made it all up, some die-hard politicos refused to believe it.

Even though the report was a fabrication, several aspects about it should give us reason to take it seriously. The first is the fact that so many political officials believed it to be authentic. The second is the report’s basic premise that instead of war being the conduct of diplomacy by other means (as postulated by Clausewitz), peace was now to be seen as the continuation of war by other means. Both reveal the warped nature of thinking about peace and war in America at the time. For much of the early cold war official government rhetoric on the subject of peace mirrored eerily the findings in the report. That rhetoric included the following: the best assurance for peace was a well-prepared military apparatus; peace could be accomplished only through strength; and peace advocacy represented a threat to national security. Ideas of war and peace were turned upside down.

Several historians have already revealed the prevalence of war in American domestic social and economic politics during the cold war. They have talked about the emergence of the garrison state (Michael Hogan), and explored the militarization of American society (Michael Sherry). More recently Mary Dudziak investigated the changing meaning of wartime in American history. Once thought of as a “time” of exception, over the course of the last half-century it was increasingly regarded as the norm with serious legal and political implications. Together these scholars made clear that for much of the cold war, Americans lived in a perpetual state of war preparedness. The nation’s social, economic, and political activities were geared toward the conduct of war and not the pursuit of peace.

And yet, despite the prevalence of a wartime sentiment in American society and culture, the rhetoric of peace was ubiquitous particularly in the 1950s and 60s. This rhetoric did not come only from those in opposition to the cold war arms build-up. It also pervaded much of the political discourse within the United States and the diplomatic exchanges between the principal cold war adversaries. Moreover, this rhetoric was not exclusively aspirational. Both sides maintained that war preparedness was an essential aspect of their peace policy. The concept of peace became an essential political tool in the conflict between East and West.

Continue reading below the break.

Saturday, February 2, 2013

The Concept of Peace

Legal scholars often write about law and war, including war’s impact on constitutional rights and powers.  But what about war’s assumed opposite: peace?  If war is exceptional – a rupture of normal time, as Jeh Johnson, then General Counsel of the Defense Department, suggested in a recent speech -- then peace is thought to be our normal time.  Peace seems to do a lot of work in American law and politics, since the arrival of peace (or the process of war’s ending and the transition to peace) is assumed to bring about a recalibration of the exceptional legal regime that war requires.   

UN Peacekeepers (Wikipedia creative commons photo)
But what is peace, and how does it work in contemporary law and politics?  Are there two sharp categories (war/peace), so that peace is the absence of military conflict, turning off the spigot of the war powers?  Or is peace, sometimes enforced by soldiers carrying arms and wearing blue UN Peacekeeping helmets, a form of military conflict?  Is peace a tactic or a rhetoric in a world of ongoing conflict?  Or is peace and idealized imaged state, a goal of human striving, that, like the concept of heaven, simply cannot exist in the material world?

An imaginative and interdisciplinary group of scholars took up these questions on an AALS panel in January on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society.  In a series of posts over the next week or two, I’ll share with you summaries or snippets from their presentations. The roundtable, organized by Matteo Taussig-Rubbo and me, included a historian of peace, Petra Goedde, Temple University Department of History; founder of the U.S. Institute of Peace, John N. Moore, University of Virginia School of Law; and interdisciplinary legal scholars Kim Lane Scheppele, Princeton University; Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, University at Buffalo Law School and Ruti G. Teitel, New York Law School(and me as Moderator).

Although not set up as a panel on my book on the concept of wartime, some speakers took the book as their starting point. Posts on the concept of wartime appeared on this blog. For more, see war reporter Peter Maass's take in The Nation.  More reviews and commentary are here.

Monday, December 31, 2012

At the AALS: The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society

If you are contemplating Peace on Earth this holiday season, you might be interested in a panel on the concept of peace at this year's AALS meeting.  With the recent suggestion that we have reached a "tipping point" in the war with al Qaeda, the question of what comes after war is more timely than ever.  Is peace the absence of violence?  Or instead is peace accomplished by force, as with militarized peacekeeping?  Is peace a transitional state?  Or is peace an anachronism in an era of endless conflict?  And how does law figure in?

An AALS Cross-cutting Panel on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society was organized by Matteo Taussig-Rubbo and me. It will be Saturday, January 5, from 3:30 to 5:15 pm in Fountain, Third Floor, Hilton New Orleans Riverside.

Here's the line-up and the panel description:
Moderator:  Mary L. Dudziak, Emory University School of Law

Speakers:
 
Petra Goedde, Temple University Department of History 
John N. Moore, University of Virginia School of Law 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Princeton University Mateo 
Taussig-Rubbo, University at Buffalo Law School 
Ruti G. Teitel, New York Law School 


Legal scholars often focus on the impact of war on law and democracy.  But what about war’s assumed opposite: “peace”?  The flip side of war, peace is a concept that is more often assumed than interrogated.  As military conflict seems to ebb and flow, lacking sharp breaks between wartime and peacetime, perhaps the concept of peace is an anachronism.  This interdisciplinary round-table will take up whether peace is a coherent concept, and the ways the idea of peace figures in domestic and international law. 


Serious study of the nature of war, peace and security is underway in other disciplines.  This panel seeks to illuminate the way perspectives from other fields can bring deeper critical inquiry to the legal study of war, peace and security.  Panelists will include scholars of international law and the law of armed conflict; legal scholars with expertise in history, anthropology, social science, and critical race theory; and a historian who studies peace. 


The panel will address:

  • What is peace?
o   an idea?

o   an aspiration?

o   a material state of existence? 
  • How does peace (its existence or nonexistence) affect domestic or international law?     

  • If contemporary war is less bounded, has the legal and conceptual need for peace dissipated? 
Cross-posted from Balkinization.

Saturday, December 1, 2012

Tipping the War on Terror

Jeh C. Johnson, General Counsel of the Defense Department, suggested this week that we may be reaching a “tipping point” in the war with Al Qaeda. 
“I do believe that on the present course, there will come a tipping point — a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that Al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed.”
Some legal scholars have reacted by treating this tipping point as if it were an ending to war.   Under the conventional formulation of wartimes and their impacts, the tipping/ending would be the moment when the imagined pendulum begins to swing in a new direction – away from wartime and the prioritization of security over rights.  Peacetime, and the normal rule of law, would then return.  Echoing this idea, Johnson remarked:  "'War' must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of affairs....Peace must be regarded as the norm toward which the human race continually strives."

If the tipping point is going to do this work, altering the very state of the world away from war/wartime, we should stop and think about what tipping is, or what it means.

Johnson may have in mind the definition of “tipping point” as “the prevalence of a social phenomenon sufficient to set in motion a process of rapid change; the moment when such a change begins to occur.” (Oxford English Dictionary) Prominent examples of this usage are in the American civil rights literature about “white flight,” but this usage appears across fields.  In his book Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell applies it to technology: “For the next three years, businesses slowly and steadily bought more and more faxes, until, in 1987, enough people had faxes that it made sense for everyone to get a fax. Nineteen eighty-seven was the fax machine Tipping Point.”

There are other meanings of tipping, such as bestowing gratuities, like tipping a cab driver, or giving private information, like passing on a tip at the racetrack.  To tip is also to upset something, as in tipping over a glass and spilling a drink.  And of course, having too much to drink can make you “tipsie.”  In this way tip, or tipping, or tipping point seems a conventional, even frivolous concept.  By itself, perhaps it does little work for us.

But the original meaning of “tipping,” according to the OED, is “The action of furnishing or fitting with a tip.”  The tip of a spear, as it were.  Sharpening the point of a spear involves burnishing its ending.  This makes the weapon sharper, and more precise.

This helps us to understand the War on Terror tipping in the context of the Obama Administration’s effort to develop rules for targeted killings, thereby legitimating and perpetuating the personalization of warfare.  We are not tipping from war to peace, if peace is understood as the absence of warfare.  Instead, we are sharpening the weapon.  This enables warfare to be more precise, more targeted, more secret, more isolated from public awareness and accountability.  In this way tipping the war on terror may not bring about an ending, but instead facilitate an ongoing war.

Cross-posted from Balkinization.