Friday, October 18, 2013
What 20th Century Wars Did Soldiers Get Medals For?
For another way to think about war, I turned to U.S. military campaign service medals. The reason I used this as a database is that they are authorized by Congress. And not every kind of conflict counts for a medal. For example, veterans' groups have lobbied for a Cold War medal, but that legislation has not passed. So this is, in essence, a U.S. government database of military service in conflicts that the United States has participated in.
My information about medals came from John E. Strandberg and Roger James Bender, "The Call of Duty": Military Awards and Decorations of the United States of America, 2nd. ed.
20th Century Wartimes?
When U.S. histories talk about war, sometimes these are the 20th century wars they talk about. These wars are important, of course. But they are not the only wars that mattered.
Wartime/Peacetime
A consequence of this way of thinking is that wartime is, by definition, temporary. Beginning a wartime involves starting something that, by definition, comes to an end.
Thursday, October 17, 2013
War Time discussion Saturday at Fire Dog Lake Book Salon
If you are looking for a post-shutdown change of scene, please join me online on Saturday at the Fire Dog Lake Book Salon for a discussion of my book War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences. The discussion is hosted by Leah Bolger of Veterans for Peace. It will be from 5 to 7 pm Eastern Time.
If you'd like to join the discussion, you can register ahead of time at Fire Dog Lake. The discussion will be on the main page.
If you'd like to join the discussion, you can register ahead of time at Fire Dog Lake. The discussion will be on the main page.
Wednesday, April 10, 2013
When does war end?
David Levine begins a review of War Time by reflecting on the murky boundaries of war during his deployment in Iraq. He writes in the Michigan Law Review that
Kenneth Anderson’s review has also just appeared in the Texas Law Review.
Crossposted from Balkinization.
while there was a reasonably clear beginning point for the exercise of these [war] powers—found in an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) rather than a formal declaration of war—from the vantage point of June 2006, it was unclear whether or when this authority would cease. There was no enemy that could surrender or sign a peace treaty, or give some other sign that “war” had ended; the forces that the United States was fighting—variously, Sunni tribesmen, Shia militias, and foreign extremists—had changed significantly since the 2003 invasion and would even change during my yearlong deployment. Although, as an officer in the U.S. military, it was very clear for me when I was at war and when I was not, the temporal bounds of this “wartime” were actually quite murky for the U.S. government. That murkiness increased significantly when considering not only the war in Iraq but also the “Global War on Terror” writ large.Levine takes up the implications for executive power, focusing on detention powers and the use of force in Libya.
Kenneth Anderson’s review has also just appeared in the Texas Law Review.
Crossposted from Balkinization.
Thursday, March 21, 2013
Obama White Paper Relied on Nixon Falsification
My op-ed in the current New York Times:
ON March 17, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon began a secret bombing campaign in Cambodia, sending B-52 bombers over the border from South Vietnam. This episode, largely buried in history, resurfaced recently in an unexpected place: the Obama administration’s “white paper” justifying targeted killings of Americans suspected of involvement in terrorism.The rest is here.
President Obama is reportedly considering moving control of the drone program from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Defense Department, as questions about the program’s legality continue to be asked. But this shift would do nothing to confer legitimacy to the drone strikes. The legitimacy problem comes from the secrecy itself — not which entity secretly does the killing. Secrecy has been used to hide presidential overreach — as the Cambodia example shows.
On Page 4 of the unclassified 16-page “white paper,” Justice Department lawyers tried to refute the argument that international law does not support extending armed conflict outside a battlefield. They cited as historical authority a speech given May 28, 1970, by John R. Stevenson, then the top lawyer for the State Department, following the United States’ invasion of Cambodia.
Since 1965, “the territory of Cambodia has been used by North Vietnam as a base of military operations,” he told the New York City Bar Association. “It long ago reached a level that would have justified us in taking appropriate measures of self-defense on the territory of Cambodia. However, except for scattered instances of returning fire across the border, we refrained until April from taking such action in Cambodia.”
In fact, Nixon had begun his secret bombing of Cambodia more than a year earlier. (It is not clear whether Mr. Stevenson knew this.) So the Obama administration’s lawyers have cited a statement that was patently false.
Cross-posted at Balkinization.
Saturday, March 9, 2013
White Paper Withheld to Avoid Political Backlash
The Boston Globe reported that the president withheld a widely sought white paper “fearing it would only intensify congressional criticism, government sources say.”
This story appeared on April 4, 1973, and it referred to a White Paper laying out the legal basis for President Richard Nixon’s decision to bomb Cambodia after U.S. troops were removed from Vietnam. Barack Obama obviously isn’t Richard Nixon, but his reluctance to disclose the legal basis for targeted killings attempts to do something that Nixon also attempted: to cloak decisions about war in government secrecy, undermining political checks on the use of military force.
Nixon’s White Paper was written by the State Department’s deputy legal advisor after questions were raised about the legal authority for bombing Cambodia. It was described as contending that military action in Cambodia was “simply part of the ending of the general Indochina war. “Therefore, it argues, Mr. Nixon has the constitutional right as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to continue the bombing.” Although there was disagreement about the rationale in the State Department, Secretary of State William P. Rogers was said to have approved the White Paper, and sent it to the White House, where it remained, apparently in the hope that the controversy over Cambodia would go away.
But as the controversy continued, “delay in disclosure now is based on White House realization of the inherent weaknesses in trying to build a constitutional case for the bombing.” The administration had tested the waters, informally discussing the draft with a few members of the Senate, but “they tore the arguments apart and told the Administration people the draft would not help in offsetting any moves to prohibit legislatively continued US military acts in Cambodia.”
Whatever happened to Nixon’s Cambodia White Paper is unclear from the sources I’ve seen so far, but it was not publicly released in 1973.
Presidents use secrecy for many reasons, some legitimate, and some illegitimate. In this case, Nixon’s State Department crafted a legal rationale, but then found that its release would only fuel congressional criticism, heightening interest in limiting Nixon’s power to use military force. Deep-sixing the legal argument was part of an effort to insulate decisions about the use of force from political reaction and political restraint.
Nixon, of course, had many other problems by 1973. He would resign from office the next year amidst the Watergate scandal and impeachment. An impeachment charge proposed but not passed related to Nixon and Cambodia, particularly his effort to keep the 1969-70 bombing of Cambodia from Congress and the American people.
There is a long, if sometimes less sordid, history of secrecy for this sort of reason: to keep Congress and the American people from undermining the president’s autonomy. If President Obama is not, in this sense, Nixonian, the best way to show it would be to make public the OLC memos detailing the legal rationale for targeted killing.
The article quoted is: Associated Press, “US reportedly withholds bombing-rationale report,” Boston Globe, April 4, 1973, p. 12. Thanks to Mary Beth Chappell of the Emory University Law Library for assisting with my research on Nixon and Cambodia.
Cross-posted from Balkinization.
Saturday, February 9, 2013
Wartime or Peacetime at the Flight 93 Crash Site
From the AALS Panel on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society:
United Airlines Flight 93 —one of the four airplanes hijacked on 9/11—crashed into a vacant parcel of land in rural Pennsylvania, killing all on board. For many, including family members of those killed in the attack and the Park Service that now manages the national memorial at the site, the former strip mine was transformed into ‘sacred’ ground. In 2009, unable to settle on a price with the landowner, the government took the property through eminent domain.
Focusing on the ongoing effort in United States of America v. 275.81 Acres of Land to determine the amount of compensation due the owner under the Fifth Amendment, I tell the story of this piece of property (in an article just posted to SSRN). Even if the attack increased the monetary value of the site fifty-fold, as the landowner’s stigma appraiser contends, it seems to me that the government should not have to pay that enhanced amount. While just compensation is typically understood to mean market value at the time of taking, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that just compensation is grounded in equity. Unlike other windfalls, there are equitable reasons, I argue, why this increase should not accrue to the landowner.
An encounter with Mary Dudziak’s work suggests that the dispute around the economic value of the Flight 93 site expresses an uncertainty about whether the context is one of wartime or peacetime. Judging by the pre-trial motions in the Western District of PA, the attorneys are applying the usual formula: market value at the time of taking, and thus any 9/11-related enhancement is included. The dispute has come down to whether the appraisals demonstrate the 9/11enhancement with sufficient certainty. In other words, the legal analysis is business-as-usual, and all the creativity has gone into the debunking of the expert’s appraisals (which, it must be admitted, do make fascinating reading). Should we call this a “peacetime” approach?
The market value at the time of taking is limited by the scope of the project rule, according to which the effects of the government’s own action should be excluded from the measure of compensation. And there are wartime takings cases that extend the scope of project rule to war, since the enhanced value created during wartime could itself be said to be due to the government project of war. But these cases don’t seem to be of much help in the Flight 93 context.
The enhanced value—if we assume it is due to the attacks and the resulting public interest in visiting the site of a national tragedy—is hardly a government project. Flight 93 is not a “wartime” case like Cors where the Court found the government did not have to pay for the increase in the price of tug-boats due to war. On the other hand, it seems odd that there is not some other way to take into account the “war” context if we assume that the enhanced value does come—in an admittedly more complex and symbolic way than in Cors—from the attacks and acts of war.
It seems that neither peacetime nor wartime will quite do the job—not an unsurprising lesson in the annals of 9/11-ology. My suggestion is to return to explicit considerations of equity. The usual formula—of market value at the time of taking and the scope of the project rule—should be seen as derivative of the injunction to provide just compensation. Now, not all will agree on what equity requires—I contend that it requires excluding the 9/11-related enhancement since the landowner never really “owned” the enhanced value. Many of the interested parties call the land “sacred”—which captures the sense that the new value created in the attack does not and perhaps should not belong to anyone. For those who disagree with my position, at least we might have a more upfront debate about the burdens (on the taxpayer and the landowner) of war and the memorialization of war, a debate akin to what Mary calls war politics. Otherwise, the danger is that we will get caught in the intricacies of competing appraisals, without stepping back and asking exactly what should be included or excluded from the appraisal.
Cross-posted from Balkinization.
Peacetime or wartime?
Just Compensation Puzzles from the United Airlines Flight 93 Crash Site
Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, SUNY Buffalo Law School
United Airlines Flight 93 —one of the four airplanes hijacked on 9/11—crashed into a vacant parcel of land in rural Pennsylvania, killing all on board. For many, including family members of those killed in the attack and the Park Service that now manages the national memorial at the site, the former strip mine was transformed into ‘sacred’ ground. In 2009, unable to settle on a price with the landowner, the government took the property through eminent domain.
Focusing on the ongoing effort in United States of America v. 275.81 Acres of Land to determine the amount of compensation due the owner under the Fifth Amendment, I tell the story of this piece of property (in an article just posted to SSRN). Even if the attack increased the monetary value of the site fifty-fold, as the landowner’s stigma appraiser contends, it seems to me that the government should not have to pay that enhanced amount. While just compensation is typically understood to mean market value at the time of taking, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that just compensation is grounded in equity. Unlike other windfalls, there are equitable reasons, I argue, why this increase should not accrue to the landowner.
An encounter with Mary Dudziak’s work suggests that the dispute around the economic value of the Flight 93 site expresses an uncertainty about whether the context is one of wartime or peacetime. Judging by the pre-trial motions in the Western District of PA, the attorneys are applying the usual formula: market value at the time of taking, and thus any 9/11-related enhancement is included. The dispute has come down to whether the appraisals demonstrate the 9/11enhancement with sufficient certainty. In other words, the legal analysis is business-as-usual, and all the creativity has gone into the debunking of the expert’s appraisals (which, it must be admitted, do make fascinating reading). Should we call this a “peacetime” approach?
The market value at the time of taking is limited by the scope of the project rule, according to which the effects of the government’s own action should be excluded from the measure of compensation. And there are wartime takings cases that extend the scope of project rule to war, since the enhanced value created during wartime could itself be said to be due to the government project of war. But these cases don’t seem to be of much help in the Flight 93 context.
The enhanced value—if we assume it is due to the attacks and the resulting public interest in visiting the site of a national tragedy—is hardly a government project. Flight 93 is not a “wartime” case like Cors where the Court found the government did not have to pay for the increase in the price of tug-boats due to war. On the other hand, it seems odd that there is not some other way to take into account the “war” context if we assume that the enhanced value does come—in an admittedly more complex and symbolic way than in Cors—from the attacks and acts of war.
It seems that neither peacetime nor wartime will quite do the job—not an unsurprising lesson in the annals of 9/11-ology. My suggestion is to return to explicit considerations of equity. The usual formula—of market value at the time of taking and the scope of the project rule—should be seen as derivative of the injunction to provide just compensation. Now, not all will agree on what equity requires—I contend that it requires excluding the 9/11-related enhancement since the landowner never really “owned” the enhanced value. Many of the interested parties call the land “sacred”—which captures the sense that the new value created in the attack does not and perhaps should not belong to anyone. For those who disagree with my position, at least we might have a more upfront debate about the burdens (on the taxpayer and the landowner) of war and the memorialization of war, a debate akin to what Mary calls war politics. Otherwise, the danger is that we will get caught in the intricacies of competing appraisals, without stepping back and asking exactly what should be included or excluded from the appraisal.
Cross-posted from Balkinization.
Wednesday, February 6, 2013
The Erosion of War and Peace in International Law
From the AALS Panel on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society:
International Law Beyond War and Peace
RutiTeitel, Straus
Fellow, NYU Law School (2012-2013); Ernst
C. Stiefel Prof of Comparative Law, NY
Law School
In general, in international law, the distinction between the state of war and the state of peace is becoming less relevant, or at least less determinative of the applicable legal norms. This produces new challenges of interpretation and new trade offs in the relation between law and politics.
Teitel, Humanity's Law |
1. First is the question of when does international criminal justice come into the picture? At Nuremberg, international criminal responsibility was conceived as fundamentally part of ius post bellum, something that occurs at the end of hostilities. In a way, it took the place of the kind of collective punishment that became questionable in the wake of the Versaille Treaty.
Today international criminal justice has a transformed functionality, coming into play during conflict, before the peace, and even ex ante (the case of Libya, where referrals to the ICC preceded military intervention in the conflict); indeed it is used as means of regulating conflict itself. We don't need to know whether conflict has ended.
This began with the Balkans war where the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created during the conflict by the Security Council and where its jurisdiction to create a tribunal was its peacemaking powers under the UN Charter chapter 7, and where the very stated aim of the law is to regulate the conflict and to restore the peace. Since then this has been reiterated in the ICC Statute.
The introduction of international criminal law during conflict raises the peace versus justice dilemma. What if the prospect of criminal justice intensifies the conflict or makes peace negotiations more difficult (e.g. Quaddaffi in Libya?)? The flip side is the politicization of law, where criminal prosecutions or the threat of them is used to achieve specific strategic political objectives such as may well have been the case vis avis Milosevic’s indictment at the time of the Dayton negotiations.
The second illustration is that it is now rather well established that international human rights law does not apply only in peacetime.
Continue reading below the fold.
Tuesday, February 5, 2013
Why the legal issues in the White Paper are not the most important issues, and how Jack Goldsmith gets it right
The
leak of a White Paper on targeting killings is getting the expected
attention from law bloggers and others, with much commentary focused on
whether the legal analysis is correct – for example the definition of
“imminence.” The precise legal analysis is a distraction from more
compelling issues, which are taken up by Jack Goldsmith in a Washington Post op-ed. I often disagree with Goldsmith, but this time I find myself in agreement. In part.
Goldsmith begins: “A decade of war is now ending,” President Obama proclaimed in his second inaugural address. But war is not ending, it is changing — and has been for years. Obama has cut back on heavy-footprint, conventional-force war in two countries. At the same time, he has presided over the rise of a secret, nimbler war defined by covert action, Special Forces, drone surveillance and targeting, cyberattacks and other stealthy means deployed in many countries.”
The character of ongoing war, largely off the American political radar screen, has been the focus of scholarly attention across fields. Ongoing secret war is an extension of ongoing small wars – justified for many years by the Cold War-era national security policy that American safety at home could only be protected by the projection of American military force around the world (NSC 68).
Goldsmith is right, unfortunately, that the president is arguing that war is coming to an end, while at the same time he continues it. (A point also made here.) He continues:
The nation most needs robust political engagement with American military policy, something we have not had in a sustained way since the war in Vietnam. Americans debated the war in Vietnam, and ultimately countless numbers took to the streets. Congress fiercely debated war appropriations. Elections were affected, as candidates gained or lost in the polls based on their position on Vietnam.
Deep public engagement with Vietnam was tied in large part to the fact that the costs of war came home to American families because of the draft. In the years since, the all-volunteer armed forces are one factor among others to isolate many Americans from war. (The other most important issues are privatization/contracting, and changes in war technologies.) A 2011 Pew Research Center report found that "A smaller share of Americans currently serve in the U.S. Armed Forces than at any time since the peace-time era between World Wars I and II." The data reveals "a large generation gap,"with "more than three-quarters (77%) of adults ages 50 and older...[having] an immediate family member –a spouse, parent, sibling or child – who had served in the military." In contrast, for people under 50, "57% of those ages 30-49 say they have an immediate family member who served. And among those ages 18-29, the share is only one-third."
In recent years, I’ve noted elsewhere,
More essential than a new framework statute, we need a form of war politics. An essential but inadequate step is transparency, so that Americans have the capacity to know what their nation is doing. More difficult but more essential, we must find a way to care about the nation’s most fearsome power, which is now exercised without our even noticing. Whether the American people can become engaged again without a draft or forces on the ground is something I can’t answer. But finding a path toward political engagement is more important now that, for Americans, the experience of war has become so easy, and so forgettable.
Cross-posted from Balkinization.
Goldsmith begins: “A decade of war is now ending,” President Obama proclaimed in his second inaugural address. But war is not ending, it is changing — and has been for years. Obama has cut back on heavy-footprint, conventional-force war in two countries. At the same time, he has presided over the rise of a secret, nimbler war defined by covert action, Special Forces, drone surveillance and targeting, cyberattacks and other stealthy means deployed in many countries.”
The character of ongoing war, largely off the American political radar screen, has been the focus of scholarly attention across fields. Ongoing secret war is an extension of ongoing small wars – justified for many years by the Cold War-era national security policy that American safety at home could only be protected by the projection of American military force around the world (NSC 68).
Goldsmith is right, unfortunately, that the president is arguing that war is coming to an end, while at the same time he continues it. (A point also made here.) He continues:
This new form of warfare needs a firmer political and legal foundation....Because secret surveillance and targeted strikes, rather than U.S. military detention, are central to the new warfare, there are no viable plaintiffs to test the government’s authorities in court. In short, executive-branch decisions since 2001 have led the nation to a new type of war against new enemies on a new battlefield without focused national debate, deliberate congressional approval or real judicial review.Although Goldsmith is right that the character of war has changed, his solution is disappointingly conventional: “What the government needs is a new framework statute — akin to the National Security Act of 1947, or the series of intelligence reforms made after Watergate, or even the 2001 authorization of force — to define the scope of the new war, the authorities and limitations on presidential power, and forms of review of the president’s actions.” This is where I disagree. Something more fundamental is in order.
The nation most needs robust political engagement with American military policy, something we have not had in a sustained way since the war in Vietnam. Americans debated the war in Vietnam, and ultimately countless numbers took to the streets. Congress fiercely debated war appropriations. Elections were affected, as candidates gained or lost in the polls based on their position on Vietnam.
Deep public engagement with Vietnam was tied in large part to the fact that the costs of war came home to American families because of the draft. In the years since, the all-volunteer armed forces are one factor among others to isolate many Americans from war. (The other most important issues are privatization/contracting, and changes in war technologies.) A 2011 Pew Research Center report found that "A smaller share of Americans currently serve in the U.S. Armed Forces than at any time since the peace-time era between World Wars I and II." The data reveals "a large generation gap,"with "more than three-quarters (77%) of adults ages 50 and older...[having] an immediate family member –a spouse, parent, sibling or child – who had served in the military." In contrast, for people under 50, "57% of those ages 30-49 say they have an immediate family member who served. And among those ages 18-29, the share is only one-third."
In recent years, I’ve noted elsewhere,
In Iraq and Afghanistan, war...spread across borders as American drones fired on targets in Pakistan and elsewhere. Death and destruction were the province of soldiers and of peoples in faraway lands. The experience of wartime for most Americans largely devolved to encounters between travelers and airport screeners, as the Transportation Security Administration adopted intrusive new practices. At home, wartime had become a policy rather than a state of existence.The only enduring limit on the use of force comes from an informed and engaged citizenry. The most troubling aspect of an era of secret warfare is that its very “secret, nimbler” character makes it easier to ignore, and thereby harder for democratic limits to function.
More essential than a new framework statute, we need a form of war politics. An essential but inadequate step is transparency, so that Americans have the capacity to know what their nation is doing. More difficult but more essential, we must find a way to care about the nation’s most fearsome power, which is now exercised without our even noticing. Whether the American people can become engaged again without a draft or forces on the ground is something I can’t answer. But finding a path toward political engagement is more important now that, for Americans, the experience of war has become so easy, and so forgettable.
Cross-posted from Balkinization.
Monday, February 4, 2013
How Peace became a Casualty of the Cold War
From the AALS Panel on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society:
The Concept of Peace During the Cold War
Petra Goedde, Department of History,Temple University
In 1967, Dial Press published what looked like a report commissioned by the US government on the “possibility and desirability of peace.” In the foreword, Leonard C. Lewin explained how a co-author of the report, who insisted on anonymity, asked him to publish it. The report determined that social stability in the United States rested on the so-called “war system, ” in which all basic political, economic, and social functions of American society were built on the assumption of being at war or preparing for war. Therefore, the report advised, a general state of peace was thoroughly undesirable for the United States, since it would produce widespread social instability and economic hardship. After outlining the non-military functions of the war system in stabilizing domestic society, the report went on to suggest ways in which these essential functions could be replicated in the event of general peace. Those included massive spending on education, health, and space to replicate the “waste” economy of the war system. It also suggested creating alternative “enemies” to ensure continued political stability(remember the “war on poverty” “ war on drugs?”). It also included a more outlandish proposal to re-introduce a modern form of slavery in order to replicate the social regulatory function of military service. The published book became a bestseller while speculation ran high whether this was an authentic report as the foreword claimed, or a well-placed hoax. A New York Times book review speculated (correctly) that it was a hoax, but many, especially those working in government, continued to believe in the report’s authenticity. Even after Lewin publicly announced in 1972, that he had made it all up, some die-hard politicos refused to believe it.
Even though the report was a fabrication, several aspects about it should give us reason to take it seriously. The first is the fact that so many political officials believed it to be authentic. The second is the report’s basic premise that instead of war being the conduct of diplomacy by other means (as postulated by Clausewitz), peace was now to be seen as the continuation of war by other means. Both reveal the warped nature of thinking about peace and war in America at the time. For much of the early cold war official government rhetoric on the subject of peace mirrored eerily the findings in the report. That rhetoric included the following: the best assurance for peace was a well-prepared military apparatus; peace could be accomplished only through strength; and peace advocacy represented a threat to national security. Ideas of war and peace were turned upside down.
Several historians have already revealed the prevalence of war in American domestic social and economic politics during the cold war. They have talked about the emergence of the garrison state (Michael Hogan), and explored the militarization of American society (Michael Sherry). More recently Mary Dudziak investigated the changing meaning of wartime in American history. Once thought of as a “time” of exception, over the course of the last half-century it was increasingly regarded as the norm with serious legal and political implications. Together these scholars made clear that for much of the cold war, Americans lived in a perpetual state of war preparedness. The nation’s social, economic, and political activities were geared toward the conduct of war and not the pursuit of peace.
And yet, despite the prevalence of a wartime sentiment in American society and culture, the rhetoric of peace was ubiquitous particularly in the 1950s and 60s. This rhetoric did not come only from those in opposition to the cold war arms build-up. It also pervaded much of the political discourse within the United States and the diplomatic exchanges between the principal cold war adversaries. Moreover, this rhetoric was not exclusively aspirational. Both sides maintained that war preparedness was an essential aspect of their peace policy. The concept of peace became an essential political tool in the conflict between East and West.
Continue reading below the break.
The Concept of Peace During the Cold War
Petra Goedde, Department of History,Temple University
In 1967, Dial Press published what looked like a report commissioned by the US government on the “possibility and desirability of peace.” In the foreword, Leonard C. Lewin explained how a co-author of the report, who insisted on anonymity, asked him to publish it. The report determined that social stability in the United States rested on the so-called “war system, ” in which all basic political, economic, and social functions of American society were built on the assumption of being at war or preparing for war. Therefore, the report advised, a general state of peace was thoroughly undesirable for the United States, since it would produce widespread social instability and economic hardship. After outlining the non-military functions of the war system in stabilizing domestic society, the report went on to suggest ways in which these essential functions could be replicated in the event of general peace. Those included massive spending on education, health, and space to replicate the “waste” economy of the war system. It also suggested creating alternative “enemies” to ensure continued political stability(remember the “war on poverty” “ war on drugs?”). It also included a more outlandish proposal to re-introduce a modern form of slavery in order to replicate the social regulatory function of military service. The published book became a bestseller while speculation ran high whether this was an authentic report as the foreword claimed, or a well-placed hoax. A New York Times book review speculated (correctly) that it was a hoax, but many, especially those working in government, continued to believe in the report’s authenticity. Even after Lewin publicly announced in 1972, that he had made it all up, some die-hard politicos refused to believe it.
Even though the report was a fabrication, several aspects about it should give us reason to take it seriously. The first is the fact that so many political officials believed it to be authentic. The second is the report’s basic premise that instead of war being the conduct of diplomacy by other means (as postulated by Clausewitz), peace was now to be seen as the continuation of war by other means. Both reveal the warped nature of thinking about peace and war in America at the time. For much of the early cold war official government rhetoric on the subject of peace mirrored eerily the findings in the report. That rhetoric included the following: the best assurance for peace was a well-prepared military apparatus; peace could be accomplished only through strength; and peace advocacy represented a threat to national security. Ideas of war and peace were turned upside down.
Several historians have already revealed the prevalence of war in American domestic social and economic politics during the cold war. They have talked about the emergence of the garrison state (Michael Hogan), and explored the militarization of American society (Michael Sherry). More recently Mary Dudziak investigated the changing meaning of wartime in American history. Once thought of as a “time” of exception, over the course of the last half-century it was increasingly regarded as the norm with serious legal and political implications. Together these scholars made clear that for much of the cold war, Americans lived in a perpetual state of war preparedness. The nation’s social, economic, and political activities were geared toward the conduct of war and not the pursuit of peace.
And yet, despite the prevalence of a wartime sentiment in American society and culture, the rhetoric of peace was ubiquitous particularly in the 1950s and 60s. This rhetoric did not come only from those in opposition to the cold war arms build-up. It also pervaded much of the political discourse within the United States and the diplomatic exchanges between the principal cold war adversaries. Moreover, this rhetoric was not exclusively aspirational. Both sides maintained that war preparedness was an essential aspect of their peace policy. The concept of peace became an essential political tool in the conflict between East and West.
Continue reading below the break.
Saturday, February 2, 2013
The Concept of Peace
Legal scholars often write about law and war, including war’s impact on constitutional rights and powers. But what about war’s assumed opposite: peace? If war is exceptional – a rupture of normal time, as Jeh Johnson, then General Counsel of the Defense Department, suggested in a recent speech -- then peace is thought to be our normal time. Peace seems to do a lot of work in American law and politics, since the arrival of peace (or the process of war’s ending and the transition to peace) is assumed to bring about a recalibration of the exceptional legal regime that war requires.
But what is peace, and how does it work in contemporary law and politics? Are there two sharp categories (war/peace), so that peace is the absence of military conflict, turning off the spigot of the war powers? Or is peace, sometimes enforced by soldiers carrying arms and wearing blue UN Peacekeeping helmets, a form of military conflict? Is peace a tactic or a rhetoric in a world of ongoing conflict? Or is peace and idealized imaged state, a goal of human striving, that, like the concept of heaven, simply cannot exist in the material world?
An imaginative and interdisciplinary group of scholars took up these questions on an AALS panel in January on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society. In a series of posts over the next week or two, I’ll share with you summaries or snippets from their presentations. The roundtable, organized by Matteo Taussig-Rubbo and me, included a historian of peace, Petra Goedde, Temple University Department of History; founder of the U.S. Institute of Peace, John N. Moore, University of Virginia School of Law; and interdisciplinary legal scholars Kim Lane Scheppele, Princeton University; Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, University at Buffalo Law School and Ruti G. Teitel, New York Law School(and me as Moderator).
Although not set up as a panel on my book on the concept of wartime, some speakers took the book as their starting point. Posts on the concept of wartime appeared on this blog. For more, see war reporter Peter Maass's take in The Nation. More reviews and commentary are here.
UN Peacekeepers (Wikipedia creative commons photo) |
An imaginative and interdisciplinary group of scholars took up these questions on an AALS panel in January on The Concept of Peace in Law, Culture and Society. In a series of posts over the next week or two, I’ll share with you summaries or snippets from their presentations. The roundtable, organized by Matteo Taussig-Rubbo and me, included a historian of peace, Petra Goedde, Temple University Department of History; founder of the U.S. Institute of Peace, John N. Moore, University of Virginia School of Law; and interdisciplinary legal scholars Kim Lane Scheppele, Princeton University; Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, University at Buffalo Law School and Ruti G. Teitel, New York Law School(and me as Moderator).
Although not set up as a panel on my book on the concept of wartime, some speakers took the book as their starting point. Posts on the concept of wartime appeared on this blog. For more, see war reporter Peter Maass's take in The Nation. More reviews and commentary are here.
Monday, January 7, 2013
On Mazower, Governing the World
My review essay on Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of An Idea, begins with this:
Cross-posted from Balkinization.
Will there be “but one heart to the globe?” asks Walt Whitman in a poem that provides an epigraph in Mark Mazower’s new book, Governing the World: The History of an Idea. At the center of this expansive work is the question of how Americans and Europeans have imagined the world, its peoples, and its nations. Is there but one global identity, as Whitman surmises? Are the world’s peoples the focus of global politics, or should nations be privileged in international affairs? Do values and culture, or degrees of civilization, set nations apart? These questions inform global affairs over time. This history matters, Mazower argues, as “we find ourselves… in a hierarchical world in which some states are more sovereign than others.”The rest is in the new issue of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas.
Power also matters: For Mazower, dominant nations come to play a role in defining the world. He embeds his narrative in the development of familiar institutions, such as the United Nations, and is especially compelling when he reveals lesser-known stories like the development of common units of measurement, presided over by social scientists in the West. This ambitious and largely convincing account falls short, however, when the author turns to contemporary matters. Disappointed that international law does not adequately constrain American war efforts, he misses an important turn in modern conflict: the way that law itself has been reimagined as a weapon of war.
Cross-posted from Balkinization.
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